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THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND WELFARE
REFORM
James Williams*
INTRODUCTION
The recent debates about welfare reform show that on national and
state levels it is good politics to 'get tough' on welfare. 824 Although the
formalized welfare system in the United States dates from the Social
Security Act of 1935,825 the modern version of welfare can be separated
into five programs:
" Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which guarantees a
national minimum level of income for the aged, blind, and
disabled.
" Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC), which
consists of cash benefits to families with incomes low enough to
qualify. The states determine the level of benefits and eligibility.
" Food stamps, which guarantee a minimum monthly income in
this form to persons with incomes below a certain level. The
dollar amount of food stamps received depends in part on the
size of the family. Federal law forbids treating food stamps
benefits as income for tax or welfare purposes.
" Pensions for veterans with low incomes and veterans' disability
compensation.
" The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"). 826
The focus of this paper is the EITC and its important role in welfare
reform.
The current welfare system has been criticized on the grounds that it
does not promote and encourage work. Critics also claim that welfare
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824 Joel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform 2 (1995).
8 25 Id. at 21.
826 Colin D. Campbell & William L. Peirce, The Earned Income Tax Credit 9 (1980).
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causes a breakdown of the family, as evidenced by the expansion of out-
of-wedlock births. The current welfare system is also criticized as not
providing enough state flexibility. Finally, critics of the welfare system
claim welfare is ineffective in reducing poverty, especially among
children.
827
The EITC addresses several of these complaints. First, the EITC "[i]s
strongly pro-work. Only working families qualify for it. In addition,
unlike welfare benefits, EITC payments rise rather than fall with earnings
across that critical low-income range where we want to encourage work
effort."8 28 Proponents of the EITC, such as Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ),
feel that it is "an effective, practical tool that provides working Americans
the chance to climb the economic ladder to the middle class and build
better opportunities for their families."
829
The effectiveness of the EITC can be evaluated by exploring its
practical implications for a hypothetical family of four. Using this as a
background, it will be possible to review both the benefits and drawbacks
of the EITC as a welfare entitlement program.
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
Congress established the EITC as part of the Tax Reduction Act of
1975.830 The EITC's original goals were to offset the negative impact of
social security taxes on the wages of low-income workers and to provide
incentives for welfare recipients to work.8 3' Supporters of the EITC
rationalize that it can stimulate the economy because low-income earners
receiving the benefits are, in theory, better able to act as consumers.8
32
The EITC gives low-income workers a reduction in the taxes that they
owe.8 33 Significantly, the EITC offers refunds to low-income workers with
827 See The Urban Institute, Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Issues, (Isabel V.
Sawhill, ed.)(visited Jan. 20, 1997) <http://www.urban.org/welfare/overview.htm>.
828 An Examination of the Development of the Earned Income Credit Tax Forms:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Info. and Regulation of the Comm. on Gov't
Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1992) (statement of Robert Greenstein, Director,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities).
829 Bradley Proposes to Restore Funds for Earned Income Tax Credit (visited Jan.
20,1997)<http://www.competition96.com/bradley/pubs/ eitc.htm>. (statement of Senator
Bradley, October 24, 1995).
830 Campbell & Peirce, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)).
831 Campbell & Peirce, supra note 3, at 1.
832 Id.
833 Id.
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no tax liabilities.83 4 The EITC distributes these refunds to eligible
taxpayers directly through the tax system.
835
The EITC in Section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides:
(1) IN GENERAL.- In the case of an eligible individual, there shall
be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle
for the taxable year an amount equal to the credit percentage of
so much of the taxpayer's earned income for the taxable year as
does not exceed the earned income amount. (emphasis added).
(2) LIMITATION.- The amount of the credit allowable to a
taxpayer under paragraph (1) for any taxable year shall not
exceed the excess (if any) of-
(A) the credit percentage of the earned income amount,
over
(B) the phaseout percentage of so much of the modified
adjusted gross income (or, if greater, the earned
income) of the taxpayer for the taxable year as exceeds
the phaseout amount.
836
Earned income means "[w]ages, salaries, tips, and other employee
compensation, plus the amount of the taxpayer's net earnings from self-
employment for the taxable year .... 837 For 1996, the maximum EITC
838that a taxpayer with one child could have received was $2,152. A
taxpayer with two or more children could have received a maximum of
$3,556, and a taxpayer with no children could have received a maximum
of $323 .839 Each year the statute adjusts these amounts for inflation based
on the Consumer Price Index.
840
Section 32(b) of the IRC defines the actual amounts that correspond to
the EITC. For 1996, these amounts are as follows:
In the case of an The credit The phaseout percentage
eligible taxpayer with: percentage is: is:
1 qualifying child r34 15.98
2 or more qualifying 40 21.06
children
834 Id.
835 Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Welfare Realities - From Rhetoric to Reform 149
(1994).
836 I.R.C. § 32(a)(1997).
837 I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A)(i) and (ii)(1997).
838 Rev. Proc. 95-53(.03)(1), 1995-2 C.B. 446-47.
839 Id.
840 I.R.C. § 320)(1)(1997).
3
Williams: The Earned Income Tax Credit and Welfare Reform
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 1996
Section 32(b)(2) describes the amounts of the EITC as follows:
In the case of an elibible The earned income The phaseout
individual with: amount is: amount is:
1 qualifying child $6,330 $11,610
2 or more qualifying $8,890 $11,610
children
No qualifying children $4,220 F$5,280842
These amounts show that a given taxpayer who has two or more children
will begin to be phased out from the maximum EITC available ($3,556) if
his or her income equals or exceeds $11,610. Once income equals or
exceeds $28,495, the EITC is completely phased out, meaning that the
taxpayer will be totally ineligible for any EITC.843
The following example illustrates the effect on a married couple with
two dependant children and an income of $10,000.
To calculate this family's EITC, it is necessary to compare their joint
income with the initial phaseout amount of $11,610 (see charts above).
Since their income of $10,000 is less than the phaseout amount and more
than the earned income amount, the couple will receive the full $3,556
EITC available.
If this family's joint income increased to $15,000, their income would
be $3,390 more than the phaseout amount ($15,000 income minus
$11,610 Threshold Phaseout amount equals a $3,390 excess). This excess
income is multiplied by the Phaseout Percentage of 21.06% (see tables
above). If we take the $3,390 excess income and multiply it by the
Phaseout Percentage, we get $713.93. Then, the excess amount ($713.93)
is subtracted from the full amount of EITC available ($3,556). The
difference ($2,842.07) is the EITC that this hypothetical family of four
with a $15,000 income would receive.
Assume the same family now earns $28,500 in 1996. Since this
income exceeds the Completed Phaseout Amount of the EITC (which is
841 I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A)(1997).
842 I.R.C. §32(b)(2)(1997).
843 See Rev. Proc. 95-53(.03)(2), 1995-2 C.B. 447.
I no qualifying children 1 7.65 17.65 841
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$28,495 for taxpayers with two or more children), the family would be
ineligible for the EITC.
The IRC provides that an "eligible individual" can be an individual
who has a "qualifying child for the taxable year."844 A "qualifying child"
is one who satisfies an age test, a relationship test, and a residency test,
and for whom the taxpayer meets an identification requirement.845 The
EITC is not available to all wage earners whose income is within statutory
parameters. Certain restrictions on eligibility exist. As originally enacted,
the EITC applied only to taxpayers with a dependant child. Now, a
taxpayer who does not have a dependant child is eligible for the EITC if
the taxpayer's "principle place of abode is in the United States for more
than one-half of such taxable year, [and the taxpayer] has attained age 25
but not attained age 65 before the close of the taxable year. ,,846 The
childless taxpayer must not be a dependant.
847
BENEFITS OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AS A COMPONENT OF
WELFARE REFORM
The EITC has several benefits that make it an important component of
welfare reform. First, because the EITC does not impose any costs on
employers, it could not contribute to job losses. 848 Second, supporters of
the EITC claim that it does not discourage work849 - it actually offers an
incentive to work because families who have no earnings do not receive a
refund check.85 °
The EITC also does not limit its coverage to poor families with
children. 851 Low income families without children are eligible, although
they receive less of a benefit. However, a family will not receive more
money for having more than two children. A family with two or more
children can receive a maximum of $3,556,852 and families receive no
more money for additional children. Thus, a family with ten children and
a family with two children both receive the same EITC rebate, assuming
both families earn the same yearly income.
Capping the EITC benefit arguably addresses the single welfare-
mother stereotype that society alleges "has several children in order to get
844 I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(1997).
845 I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(1997).
846 I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(1997).
847 Id.
848 Bane & Ellwood, supra note 12, at 149.
849 See The Urban Institute, supra note 4.
850 See Campbell & Peirce, supra note 3, at 18.
851 Contra id. at 9.
852 Rev. Proc. 95-53 (.03)(1), 1995-2 C.B. 446-47.
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more welfare." 853 Critics of the EITC have countered this by arguing that
the Credit's disregard of family size shows that it is not a good welfare
program.854 A larger family has greater needs and a cogent welfareprogram should address this.855
The EITC allows people to choose how they spend the assistance they
receive to best meet their family's needs. The EITC provides a lump sum
benefit once a year. Critics suggest that the lump sum benefit "is not a
particularly effective way of moving people and encouraging people to
work when they are not getting that consistent benefit every month in their
paycheck. ' 856 Because the Internal Revenue Service sends the refund
directly to the recipient, the EITC allows anonymity. Current welfare
recipients may find the welfare system "degrading and demoralizing" 857
because it "has come to emphasize eligibility and compliance to the
exclusion of nearly every other goal., 858 Advocates claim that the EITC is
a cheaper and simpler form of welfare than other alternatives because the
government distributes it directly through the federal tax system.
859
CHALLENGES OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AS A COMPONENT OF
WELFARE REFORM
As stated, a major goal of the EITC is to serve as an incentive to
work.860 However, critics contend that "setting the poor to work is
expensive and extremely problematic administratively; this should give us
pause before we embrace another 'new solution."' 861 The expense of
putting poor families to work is especially apparent with poor single
mothers. Without extensive support, it is unlikely that women with young
children will be able to work.862 Therefore, the government may need to
address child care issues before relying on EITC-type incentives which
require work as a basis for entitlement.
The EITC does not, by itself, create jobs.863 It also does not address the
question of whether additional resources should be expended to help
853 Handler, supra note 1, at 3-4.
854 Campbell & Peirce, supra note 3, at 10.
855 Id.
856 Selected Aspects of Welfare Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures and Subcomm. on Human Resources of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993) (statement of Mr. Rick Santorum, Pa.).
857 The Urban Institute, supra note 4.
858 Bane & Ellwood, supra note 12, at 2.
859 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 534 (1995).
860 See Bosarge v. United States Dep't of Educ., 5 F.3d 1414, 1420 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
861 Handler, supra note 1, at 32-33.
862 Bane & Ellwood, supra note 12, at 140.
863 Handler, supra note 1, at 143.
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potential recipients of the EITC find jobs, or whether potential recipients
should be left to find work on their own. Factors such as "[c]hild care
problems, health care issues, school problems, bad neighborhoods, and so
forth, [make] it... questionable how young children and adolescents will
fare when their mothers have to work enough hours to achieve self-
sufficiency."
864
Critics have also argued that the EITC's effectiveness in promoting work
is often exaggerated.865 As this paper shows, even a cursory analysis of
the EITC can become complex. This complexity may keep potential
recipients from understanding how employment creates EITC benefits.
866
Critics of the EITC claim that "[t]his informational gap may blunt both the
EITC's potential incentives and its potential disincentives."
867
Some have criticized the EITC for its structural limitations, which can
arguably cause compliance, accuracy, and responsiveness problems.
868
For example, the EITC would not be responsive to low-income taxpayers
who do not file tax returns because their income is below the filing
threshold. Because the EITC is only dispersed through the tax system,
these taxpayers will not receive the credit unless they specifically file for
an EITC refund.869
Taxpayers who are eligible for EITC may purposely choose not to file
a return because the benefit does not necessarily justify their filing a tax
return. 87 However, this criticism is not compelling because studies have
shown that the "EITC participation rate was 75 to 90 percent in 1990, with
the most reliable estimates falling in the 80 to 86 percent range."
871
Finally, the EITC's dependance on the tax system may cause accuracy
problems. This is because the tax system narrowly defines "income."
872
The plethora of tax preferences and exclusions that exist can create an
imprecise picture of a taxpayer's actual wealth.873 These potential
inaccuracies could cause some taxpayers to receive EITC benefits when
they should not be entitled to them.
874
864 Id. at 33.
865 Alstott, supra note 36, at 534.
8 66 Id. at 548.
867 Id.
868 Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and Some Fundamental Institutional
Dilemmas of Tax-Transfer Integration, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 609, 609 (1994).
869 John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and
Antipoverty Effectiveness, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 63, 64 (1994).870 Id. at 72.
8 7 1 Id. at 79.
872 Alstott, supra note 45, at 611.
873 Id.
874 Id.
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The EITC is not a complete solution to welfare concerns in this
country. 875 "Because welfare will continue to be necessary, whatever form
of wage or earnings credit may be enacted, one cannot escape the question
of whether and how welfare should be reformed. ,
876
CONCLUSION
The EITC has an important place in welfare reform, though it has
received little attention in the debate. 877 This lack of debate is surprising
because the EITC is responsible for granting approximately twenty
million Americans a tax refund.878 "The expansion of the EITC under the
Clinton administration is one of the most important antipoverty income
transfer measures to have been enacted in a generation. When fully
funded, it will pull about fourteen million working poor families out of
poverty. "
8 7 9
In Poor Support, David Ellwood proposed an expansion of the EITC,
plus an increase in the minimum wage and child care benefits.
880
Ellwood's proposal requires a mother to work part- time. He argues that
this plan could bring single mothers up to the poverty line.882 Although the
Clinton Administration loosely based its proposals on Ellwood's
theories,88 3 the current budget limitations suggest that Ellwood's ideas are
unlikely to be implemented soon.
According to Wendell E. Primus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Human Services Policy for the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, the time has come "[t]o be bold .... The real hope is to replace,
rather than reform, welfare. That requires making independence and self-
support genuinely feasible. The President calls on Government to support,
rather than supplant, the efforts of parents. He asks that we reinforce
work.
, 884
875 See Henry Aaron, Welfare Reform: What Kind and When?, in Income Support 322,
328 (Peter G. Brown et al. eds., 1981).
876 [d.
877 See Handler, supra note 1, at 141.
878 Earned Income Tax Credit (visited January 20, 1997)
<http ://www.tripod.com/politics/playbook/issues/incometax.html>.
879 Handler, supra note 1, at 141.880 David Ellwood, Poor Support 180 (1988).
881 Id.
882 Id.
883 Handler, supra note 1, at 140.884 Selected Aspects of Welfare Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures and Subcomm. on Human Resources of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993) (statement of Wendell E. Primus, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Human Services Policy, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services).
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Commentators suggest welfare reform should move forward "with
uniform national mandates, when we can be reasonably certain the
consequences of innovation will be beneficial." '885
Although the EITC appears to successfully embrace the typical
complaints about the current welfare system, policy-makers will need
empirical data to establish the actual effects and successes of the EITC.886
885 Robert D. Reischauer & R. Kent Weaver, Financing Welfare: Are Block Grants the
Answer?, in Looking Before We Leap: Social Science and Welfare Reform 13, 17 (R.
Kent Weaver & William T. Dickens, eds., 1995).
886 See Alstott, supra note 36, at 554.
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